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Abstract
The article critically interrogates the figure of the child in Deleuze and its relation to 
language, as an entry point to the question of what a materialist theory of language 
might involve, and how it might be put to work in qualitative methodology. The 
Deleuzian child is a figure of destratification and resistance to dominant narratives – a 
resistance that is inextricably bound up with the materiality of the child’s body and its 
relation to language. Not yet fully striated by the rules of grammar that order and 
subjugate the world, children challenge ‘the hegemony of the signifier’ by remaining 
open to multiple semiotic connections (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987, p. 15). What 
would it mean for qualitative methodology to engage its own ‘becoming-child’?
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I am afraid we are not rid of God because we still have faith in grammar 
(Nietzsche 1982, p. 483).
Children are supplied with syntax like workers being given tools
(Deleuze, 1995, p. 41)
Introduction
In this article I examine the figure of the child and its relation to language, as an entry 
point to the question of what a materialist theory of language might involve, and how 
it might be put to work in qualitative methodology. I also consider the implications for 
theory and research on children and childhood. The arguments are animated by the 
image of the child in the work of Deleuze, in particular in A Thousand Plateaus 
(Deleuze & Guattari, 1987; hereafter ATP). The Deleuzian child is a figure of de-
stratification and resistance to dominant structures and value systems – a resistance 
that is inextricably bound up with the materiality of the child’s body and its relation to 
language. Not yet fully striated by the rules of grammar that order and subjugate the 
world, children challenge ‘the hegemony of the signifier’ by remaining open to 
multiple semiotic connections that do not obey the laws of conventional language and 
representation.
I begin by discussing some key aspects of a materialist theory of language as 
elaborated by Deleuze-Guattari, and then focus more specifically on the refrain or 
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ritornello, a concept explicitly associated with the child in the work of Deleuze and 
Guattari. The refrain or ‘little song’ establishes ‘the beginnings of order in chaos’. It 
marks out a fragile territory that nevertheless has the capacity to ‘open onto a future’. 
Deleuze and Guattari give the instance of the child who hums to himself as he walks 
fearfully in the dark. The refrain is pre-eminently a-grammatical and a-signifying: it 
accomplishes a ‘“holding together” of heterogeneous elements’ (ATP, p. 323). I 
discuss some examples of the refrain in a corpus of video recordings of young 
children in the earliest years at school, assembled during a study of classroom 
language.  
Such materially-engaged, a-signifying semiotics do not disappear as the child grows 
up and becomes more adept and embroiled in the ‘order-words’ of conventional 
language. Rather, they persist as affective ‘blocks of becoming’ that Deleuze and 
Guattari call ‘becoming-child’, and which they assert can befall us and carry us off in 
unforeseen trajectories at any age (ATP, p. 294). The notion of becoming-child should 
not be confused, then, with the progress of real children on the supposedly inexorable 
path towards adulthood. As Hickey-Moody (2013) notes, the untimely incursions of 
becoming-child disrupt the very idea of growing up as a linear process. Still, I suggest 
that there are implications for encounters with children in educational settings. I also 
argue that materialist research methodologies need to embrace the a-signifying, 
affective elements that are at play in becoming-child: these haunt qualitative ‘data’, 
but are still often dismissed as ‘junk’ material that distracts from truth, meaning or 
authenticity.
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Note: I often use the pronoun ‘it’ rather than ‘he’ or ‘she’ in connection with the child, 
not in order to deny the humanity of children, but to invoke the critique of humanism 
that is central to Deleuzian thought. Children bear witness to something 
‘indiscernible’ that is more and less than human, and in this resides their 
transformative potential to challenge the seeming ‘irreducibility of the human order’ 
(ATP, 273).
Language and the new materialisms 
Before turning to the Deleuzian child, it is important to establish why language is an 
issue for new materialist thought and practice. As will already be implicit in the 
comments above, language holds a degraded status within the ‘material turn’. 
In much ‘new materialist’ work1, it is axiomatic that language has been accorded too 
much privilege in the dominant paradigms of 20th century thought.2 Barad, in one of 
the founding statements of new materialism, voiced the complaint thus:
Language has been granted too much power. The linguistic turn, the semiotic 
turn, the interpretative turn, the cultural turn: it seems that at every turn lately 
every “thing” – even materiality – is turned into a matter of language or some 
other form of cultural representation (Barad, 2003, p. 801).
Barad is criticising here a pervasive ‘representationalism’ (see also Olkowski, 1999; 
Hekman, 2010) that renders material realities subordinate to the linguistic, cultural or 
discourse systems that supposedly represent or mediate them. For Deleuze 
representational thought is ‘sedentary’. It is the enemy of difference, movement, 
change and the emergence of the new. Pure difference, ‘difference in itself’ in 
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Deleuze’s words, is ‘crucified’ by representation – trussed and held in place by its 
‘quadripartite fetters, under which only that which is identical, similar, analogous, or 
opposed can be considered difference’ (1994, p. 174).
Representation bifurcates the world into signifiers and signifieds, subjects and 
predicates, discourse and materiality, nature and culture, words and worlds, essences 
and appearances, government and people, genus and species. It locks elements in 
place according to the position they are assigned on the forking branches of its 
‘arborescent’ structure, as in the tree diagram below. Yet at the same time, its ‘root-
tree’ logic ensures that everything is governed by a single, overarching or 
underpinning, ‘eminent term’ (ATP, p. 235). For Deleuze and Guattari, the tree 
diagrams that define grammatical sentences in Chomsky’s linguistics are exemplary 
instances of root-tree logic or ‘the law of the One’, since they ‘begin at a point S 
[sentence] and proceed by dichotomy’ (ATP, p. 5). For example:
    
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Generative_grammar)
The dominant term at the top of the tree (S) bifurcates into two elements, Noun Phrase 
(NP) and Verb Phrase (VP), and each of these further divides until we get to the 
lowest elements. 
‘We’re tired of trees … they’ve made us suffer too much’, write Deleuze and Guattari 
(ATP, p. 15). And it is in opposition to this prevailing ‘arborescent culture’ that 
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Deleuze and Guattari develop their concept of the rhizome, with its transversal, 
mobile, decentred organisation. Their earliest, much-quoted description of the 
rhizome in A Thousand Plateaus relates to language.   
A rhizome ceaselessly establishes connections between semiotic chains, 
organizations of power, and circumstances relative to the arts, sciences, and 
social struggles. A semiotic chain is like a tuber agglomerating very diverse 
acts, not only linguistic, but also perceptive, mimetic, gestural and cognitive; 
there is no language in itself, nor are there any linguistic universals, only a 
throng of dialects, patois, slangs, and specialized languages. There is no ideal 
speaker-listener, any more than there is a homogeneous linguistic 
community3… There is no mother tongue, only a power takeover by a 
dominant language within a political multiplicity. Language stabilizes around 
a parish, a bishopric, a capital … It spreads like a patch of oil.  (ATP, p. 7)
Language is only one among many sign systems therefore, even if it has the power to 
overcode other semiotic systems. It does not spring from a root, whether historically 
or structurally, but springs up in different places and propagates laterally (‘like a patch 
of oil’) according to its pragmatic involvements in material and political affairs. It 
cannot be separated therefore from all the non-linguistic stuff that supposedly lies 
‘outside’ it, and which is typically consigned by linguists to the ‘trash-heap’ of 
pragmatics. Language is inescapably social, but it is also impersonal: ‘my’ voice does 
not emanate from inside me, but issues from the collective assemblage of enunciation 
- ‘the murmur from which I take my proper name, the constellation of voices, 
concordant or not, from which I draw my voice’ (Deleuze, 2004: 93). There is no 
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ideal, universal ‘deep structure’ beneath the surface variations of dialects or styles. 
Rather, variation itself is ontologically prior. Deleuze and Guattari consider this point 
so important that they put it in italics, and wonder why Chomsky would ‘pretend not 
to understand’ it: ‘You will never find a homogeneous system that is not still or  
already affected by a regulated, continuous, immanent process of variation’ (ATP, p. 
103; original emphasis). 
Although the critique of language and representation is a significant element of new 
materialist thought in general, the work of Deleuze-Guattari is distinctive in the 
amount of detailed theoretical attention given to language and its involvements with 
materiality, politics and the virtual. Language is intimately implicated in the 
production of state and social order. Its primary function is not – contrary to common 
wisdom - to represent, refer, inform or communicate, but rather to transmit ‘order-
words’ (ATP, p. 79; italics added). Order-words are disciplinary, both in the sense of 
commanding obedience and of creating order. They carry the implicit presuppositions 
that produce subjects and command social obligation in a given society, and might be 
better translated as ‘slogans’, since this emphasizes their unavoidably political, 
pragmatic and collective force (ATP, p. 83). 
Deleuze and Guattari say that order-words are deathly. They perform ‘a little death 
sentence’ (ATP, p. 107) since they arrest the movements of becoming and variation in 
order to separate and distinguish a body from others. Once subject to an order-word, 
something takes shape, at the expense of all the other unrealized potentialities that are 
closed off, or killed off, by the verdict. Yet it is through the order-word that the 
alchemy that articulates language and life is achieved. Order-words  ‘pin meaning to 
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bodies’ (Lambert, 2014, p. 39), instantaneously transforming relations between bodies 
and language, expression and content. These transformations are incorporeal. In a 
high-jacking for instance, there are corporeal acts – waving guns, shouting, shooting 
etc. - but the transformation of the passengers into hostages, and the ‘plane-body’ into 
a ‘prison-body’ is incorporeal and instantaneous (ATP, p. 81). 
Order-words are strongly associated with grammaticality. Indeed, like Nietzsche, who 
equated the work of god and grammar, Deleuze and Guattari treat grammaticality and 
discipline as synonyms in terms of their function of creating/imposing structure. 
Grammaticality extracts constants from inherent variation; it regulates ‘all the 
indisciplines at work in language’ (ATP, p. 79); and it always involves power. 
Referring to the Chomskyan tree diagram discussed above, Deleuze and Guattari spell 
out the association of grammar and power.  
What is grammaticality, and the sign S, the categorical symbol that dominates 
statements? It is a power marker before it is a syntactical marker, and 
Chomsky’s trees establish constant relations between power variables. 
Forming grammatically correct sentences is for the normal individual the 
prerequisite for any submission to social laws. No-one is supposed to be  
ignorant of grammaticality; those who are belong in special institutions (ATP, 
p. 101; emphasis added)
 
The a-grammatical child
And now we are coming closer to the child, since those ‘special institutions’ for the 
correction or containment of the a-grammatical referred to in the quote above would 
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include, in addition to the lunatic asylum, the school. Children are risky subjects with 
polymorphous interests and polysemic capabilities, whose submission to the 
discipline of grammar cannot be assumed. They are rhizomatic – ‘an embodied flow 
of pauses and rushes’ as Hickey-Moody (2013, p. 278) puts it - and therefore always a 
potential threat to order. Deleuze and Guattari observe that ‘linguistics can tolerate no 
polyvocality or rhizome traits: a child who runs around, plays, dances, and draws 
cannot concentrate attention on language and writing, and will never be a good 
subject’ (ATP, p. 180). Hickey-Moody (p. 276) describes the Deleuzian child as a 
‘vector of affect’4 – a ‘polymorphously perverse body’ that challenges the linguistic-
oedipal structures that attempt to contain its deterritorializing force. Children do not 
necessarily observe the etiquette that gives precedence to linguistic over non-
linguistic signs, or indeed to humans over animals or objects. They are not contained 
within the hierarchical structures of ‘filiation and heredity’ that underpin tree-logic 
and the oedipal relation but consort according to the logic of the pack, which 
proliferates by alliance, contagion and epidemic (ATP, p. 241). 
The child, in short, ranges over flat terrains, dancing, singing and sliding laterally, 
forming assemblages through ‘unnatural nuptials’ (ATP, 273) with heterogeneous 
entities, human and nonhuman. It is never fully in thrall to the deep structures of 
language, representation and the ‘Oedipal symbolic community’ (ATP, p. 274). There 
is always the chance, then, that children will unmoor or uproot the constants that hold 
the linguistic sign system together: that ‘gestural, mimetic, ludic and other semiotic 
systems [will] regain their freedom and extricate themselves from … the dominant 
competence of the teacher’s language’ (ATP, p. 15). Pedagogy is required to produce 
incorporeal transformations upon children, converting them into pupils with specific 
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sets of social obligations and specific identities. This is a constant and all-consuming 
mission: as Cole (2013, p. 95) observes, ‘[t]he order-words “flow” around places of 
learning like the routing of electricity in plasterboard walls’. 
The pedagogy of order-words is not of course confined to school situations. Consider 
the following snippet of talk from a mother to her two-year old in a restaurant queue, 
presented in Luke (1995, p. 21).5
We’re in a long line, Jason. Aren’t we? There are lots of people lined up here, 
waiting for a drink. Look [pointing] they’re carrying a Christmas tree with lots 
of things on it. They’re moving it. Do we have a Christmas tree like that? 
Viewed from a Deleuzian materialist perspective, we can see this mundane little 
monologue as an exercise in grammaticality and representation. Jason’s mother 
contours and disciplines a bit of the world for him. She names it and peoples it; 
invests actions with purpose and reason; establishes what is normal and meaningful, 
and thereby demonstrates the very possibility of pinning meaning to the body of the 
world, and the body of oneself. She invites Jason to consider his place within this 
world: to think in terms of the fixed relations of similarity and difference afforded by 
the logic of representation (‘Do we have a Christmas tree like that?’). At the same 
time she indicates that it is possible to stand ‘outside’ this world in order to observe 
and comment on it. Jason is thus invited to occupy the position of the ‘central point’ 
or ‘third eye’ which, according to the ‘law of arborescence’, ranges over all space, 
dispensing binary oppositions: ‘male-(female), adult-(child), white-(black, yellow or 
red); rational-(animal)’ (ATP, p. 292). This central point that surveys all and dispenses 
binary oppositions, while installing itself as the principal term of each opposition, 
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constitutes the majority. Even when exercised by women (as here), or children or 
people of other ethnicities, the majority is coded male: it is the exercise of a ‘virile 
majoritarian agency’ (ATP, p. 293).  As Luke (1995: 22) notes, albeit from a different 
analytic framework, Jason is constituted in this fleeting fragment as ‘a young, male 
Anglo-Australian’.
The language I have used here seems to assign strong agency and personal 
responsibility to Jason’s mother. It implies that she orchestrates and controls the 
disciplinary event. But from a Deleuzian perspective, Jason’s mother too is subject to 
the ‘verdict’ of the order-word even if, and even as she speaks from a majoritarian 
position. Her role and identity are drawn from the assemblage that precedes and 
envelops her, and which confers subjectivity and social obligation upon her.
There are no individual statements, there never are. Every statement is the 
product of a machinic assemblage, in other words, of collective agents of 
enunciation (take ‘collective agents’ to mean not peoples or societies but 
multiplicities). The proper name … does not designate an individual: it is on 
the contrary when the individual opens up to the multiplicities pervading him 
or her, at the outcome of the most severe operation of depersonalization, that 
he or she acquires his or her true proper name’ (ATP, p. 37; emphasis added).
As suggested above, it is precisely because of the child’s rhizomatic, ‘minoritarian’ 
tendencies that it is so rigorously subject to the pedagogy of the order-word. The child 
in Deleuze is one of those figures – along with madmen, poets and literary giants of 
‘minority’ languages – whose language has the power to unmoor or uproot the 
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‘constants’ of  ‘public language’ and release the immanent variation that is always 
only provisionally held in place in the order-word. For order-words also have the 
potential to become passwords – ‘components of passage’ and deterritorialization 
rather than of stoppage and stratification (ATP, p. 110). As switching points in the 
relations of force between content and expression, order-words may flip into 
passwords, opening up possibilities of flight or passage in new directions by radically 
un-settling the boundaries between words and things, transforming both into one 
‘common matter’. When this happens, ‘[g]estures and things, voices and sounds, are 
caught up in the same “opera”, swept away by the same shifting effects of 
stammering, vibrato, tremolo and overspilling (ATP, p. 109).
A-grammaticality consists precisely in this putting-into-variation of the constants of 
language, of causing language to stutter. Deleuze and Guattari discuss the work of the 
poet e.e.cummings, whose a-grammatical formulations such as ‘he went his did’ 
uproot grammatically correct forms from their status as constants, and thereby 
constitute a ‘cutting edge of deterritorialization of language’ (ATP, 99).6  Children too 
are a-grammatical artisans, capable of detaching words or phrases from their syntactic 
environment and their heavy freight of meaning and signification in order to play with 
them. They can, and do, get caught up in the base material that lies on the boundaries 
of language, body, gesture and music - noises, jingles, snatches of doggerel, rhymes, 
jokes. 
These child actions can be considered as refrains or ritornellos, which for Deleuze and 
Guattari are forms of organisation that precede and interrupt the workings of language 
and representation. I want to turn now to some examples of refrains in a corpus of 
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audio and video recordings of young children (aged 5-6), assembled during a study of 
classroom language that was conducted in the1970s.7  The children involved wore 
radio-microphones that picked up their words and deeds as they moved around the 
classroom. The recordings afford rare access to the refrains, intermezzi and sound-
games of children that run alongside and amongst the ‘public language’ and the 
officially sanctioned activities of the schooling. I am going to assume, for the 
purposes of the present exploration, that the a-grammatical logic of the refrains of 
young children in UK classrooms will not have changed substantially over the 
intervening decades, even though the specific contents of these refrains will 
undoubtedly have done so. 
The refrain: excerpts from the a-grammatical songbook
For Deleuze and Guattari, the refrain is firstly a marker of territory. The refrain 
establishes ‘the beginnings of order in chaos’. Refrains are found in many disparate 
domains – in bird song, Proust, music, and the humming of the ‘housewife’ (yes, I’m 
afraid so…), ‘as she marshalls the antichaos forces of her work’ (1987: 311). But the 
famous opening paragraph to the section on the refrain in A Thousand Plateaus 
specifically starts out from the song of a child. 
A child in the dark, gripped with fear, comforts himself by singing under his 
breath. He walks and halts to his song. Lost, he takes shelter, or orients 
himself with his little song as best he can. The song is like a rough sketch of a 
calming and stabilizing, calm and stable center in the heart of chaos. Perhaps 
the child skips as he sings, hastens or slows his pace. But the song itself is 
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already a skip: it jumps from chaos to the beginnings of order in chaos and is 
in danger of breaking apart at any moment. (ATP, p. 311)
In the classroom video recordings, refrains come and go in the repetitive sounds, 
movements, word games, facial expressions and gestures of children as they move 
through the classroom and the school day.  Here is an example:
Refrain 1. ‘Summer Loving’ 
Moving away from the teacher’s desk, where he has been reading aloud, a boy 
heads for his book drawer and rummages in it, whistling and then humming 
snatches of a song from that summer’s blockbuster movie, Grease.  
(Fragments of ‘Summer Loving’ often floated across the surface of the project 
classrooms in that autumn of 1978). 
Little episodes such as these seem so lightweight as to be scarcely noticeable – mere 
‘fillers’ in a child’s transitions from one educationally significant moment to the next. 
But they are everywhere in the recordings, and it is worth thinking further about what 
they might be doing, as they seem to me to have many of the characteristics of the 
refrain or ritornello. Through their tunes and whistles and jingles, children establish a 
‘portable territory’ (ATP, p. 320) – a place to perch in the shapeless flux of interstitial 
space and time in the classroom.
The refrain is not however, or not necessarily, a closed off space of interiority. 
Although it works to establish a center amidst chaos, and marks the boundaries of a 
‘home’, the refrain also has the potential to open onto an outside, and to connect with 
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others. Deleuze and Guattari write:  ‘one opens the circle a crack, opens it all the way, 
lets someone in, calls someone, or else goes out oneself… One launches forth, 
hazards an improvisation’ (ATP, p. 311). The improvisatory aspect of the refrain, and 
its capacity to call others in, can be seen in this little passage involving children who 
are seated in small groups around circular tables, having been assigned group-work 
tasks by the teacher.
Refrain 2: ‘Goody goody yum yum’
A girl leans over to tell a group at an adjacent table that ‘The Goodies [TV 
show] is on today’, and someone sings the first line of the theme song - 
‘Goodies! Goody goody yum yum’. This is taken up by others, who preserve 
the tune on each iteration, while the words morph from ‘goody goody yum 
yum’ to ‘goody goody gum drops’ (itself a stock phrase that the theme tune 
echoes and therefore a refrain) to ‘goody goody gum poo’. Children laugh. 
The passage of the refrain from one child to another, and their pleasure in the 
transition, incorporates them as confederates in a territory that is traced by its 
movement between them. This is pack logic, as discussed above, in which connection 
proceeds via contagion, affect and epidemic rather than by meaning and signification. 
The refrain does not need to be a tune or melody. Deleuze and Guattari note that 
refrains are often ‘sonorous’, but can also be ‘optical, gestural, motor, etc.’ (ATP, p. 
323). And words themselves can operate as refrains or as components of refrains, as 
the repetition-substitution of yum yum–gum drops-gum poo above suggests. 
Rhythmic repetitions of facial expressions, laughter, body postures, movements and 
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words can all be mobilised in the improvisatory work of the refrain.  This happens in 
the following extract in which two boys – both coincidentally (and felicitously) called 
James – spool out in counterpoint a refrain that involves word play, mirrored gestures 
and facial expressions, as they sit together in the sunshine spilling onto the sofa, 
waiting to go out at break time. James B has said to the teacher that he wants to take 
his jumper (sweater) off because he’s hot.
Refrain 3. ‘We’re boilin’’
James 1: yeah, we’re boilin’, we’re boilin’ like roast on the oven aren’t 
we?
we’re like roast chicken
James 2: yeah! [laughing]
James 1: we’re peas and carrots roastin’
in a pressure cooker
James 2: we’re, we’re like a waistcoat
burnt
James 1: yeah, warm.
oh my sweaty! [rubs his face with both hands]
James 2: oh I’m sweatin’ I’m sweatin’ (indecipherable) [rubbing his 
face]
James 1: oh I’m sweatin’ hot [rubbing his face]
In this refrain, words, body postures, laughs and gestures work together in rhythmic 
counterpoint. It is significant that, as in the previous example, language does not seem 
to be operating conventionally. Although James and James are assuredly connecting 
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with one another, and indeed are embarked on a kind of joint experimentation out of 
which the refrain unfolds, they do not seem to be involved in ‘communication’, if this 
is understood as a transmission or exchange of meanings. Instead, the event exhibits 
the capacity of the refrain to effect the ‘”holding together”’ of heterogeneous 
elements’ (ATP, p. 323). Unlikely and unfamiliar objects, multisensory affects, 
movements, facial expressions and utterances are assembled in/by the refrain, in 
contrast to the ordered hierarchies of ‘families’ of entities built by representation. 
Linked to this, the example testifies to the element of chance that attends the 
formation and elaboration of a refrain. Peas, carrots, waistcoats, sofas, hot sweaters on 
a sunny day, bodies turned towards each other, and mirrored gestures are unlikely and 
unpredictable components of an affective assemblage, but they ‘hold together’ in the 
refrain of James and James. In a refrain such as this, language is again freed from its 
representational function, and mobilises sensations and affects.   
The words used by the two Jameses here seem to operate in a manner akin to 
nonsense, which Deleuze (2004), animated by Lewis Carroll, associates with the ‘mad 
element’ that subsists within language, attesting to its materiality and its 
entanglements with bodies. Nonsense is the paradoxical element in language that 
exceeds propositional meaning and frustrates the laws of representation. For Deleuze 
nonsense is productive since it keeps language open and mobile. Williams (2008: 69) 
writes: ‘Nonsense works. It can wound and delight, sooth and excite. When it does so, 
not only are sensations and affects transmitted, but claims to corral them through 
proper use founder’. 
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A further example of nonsense can be seen in Joanna’s extended riff on her 
‘chickenwire’ below, and her attempts – rather unsuccessful - to form a ‘portable 
territory’ (ATP, p. 320) around this phrase.  
Refrain 3. ‘Chickenwire’
The chickenwire emerges from a conventional conversational exchange 
between Joanna and a boy about the aerial wire hanging from the radio 
microphone receiver that Joanna wears around her waist. She and the boy are 
aware that the microphone is transmitting sound to the receiver, and the boy 
urges her to ‘say connecting wire’ into the lapel microphone pinned to her 
cardigan. Joanna replies that it is ‘chickenwire’, and takes this phrase on a tour 
round the classroom, attempting to recruit classmates to an encounter – ‘Look! 
Chickenwire’! She is intermittently successful, as children move in and out of 
engagement. On its travels, as Joanna attempts to draw attention to the 
chickenwire, it becomes, in her mouth, chickenbiker, chickenRobert, 
chickenruler, chickenDaniel, chickeneverything and chickenpickle. Finally, 
finding it difficult to secure attention and sustain a territory in the 
‘neighborhood’ of the chickenwire, Joanna returns to her seat at her group’s 
table and resorts to propositional language: ‘look it can bend, and it’s straight. 
It’s wire’. But the phrase has (thereby) lost its magic, and she is forced to 
concede the point made by her tablemate, that although it’s wire, it isn’t 
chicken wire. Joanna subsides into her chair, silent but kicking her foot 
rhythmically, as the camera pulls back and reveals the teacher standing behind 
Joanna’s group, waiting for the class to re-enter the official time and territory 
of the classroom.
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Joanna’s refrain, although ultimately unsuccessful, replays most of the characteristics 
that have already been identified in the refrain: its territorialising function, exercised 
through the use of rhythmic repetition to carve a kind of ‘consistency’ out of chaos; its 
openness to new connections through improvisation and experiment; its resistance to 
recuperation for conventional language, and the draining of its powers of affect when 
ordinary – that is, representational - language returns.
As noted above, ‘chickenwire’ seems to operate in a manner similar to Lewis Carroll’s 
nonsense words, such as ‘Snark’ and ‘frumious’, or to the nonsense words in 
children’s nursery rhymes which interested Deleuze, such as ‘pimpanicaille’. The 
nonsense word, or esoteric word holds a special place in Deleuze’s anti-
representational theory of language and meaning as elaborated in The Logic of Sense 
(2004). The esoteric word is a ‘blank word’ (2004, p. 79) - a paradoxical word-thing 
that does not have conventional linguistic meaning or reference. Chickenwire. The 
esoteric word does not obey the regressive logic according to which x ‘means’ y, 
which in turns ‘means’ z and so on. Instead, according to Deleuze, it ‘denotes exactly 
what it expresses and expresses what it denotes’; or more economically, it ‘says its 
own sense’ (2004, p. 79). It is productively blank, and blankly productive. Belonging 
to both words and things, and equally to neither, having no meaning outside of itself, 
the esoteric word signals both ‘excess and lack, empty square and supernumerary 
object’ (2004, p. 78). In this dual, but asymmetrical capacity, the paradoxical element 
in the esoteric word runs along heterogeneous series causing them to ‘resonate and 
converge’ as signifying and signified respectively; but also making them ramify, 
producing disjunctions and diversions into new territories. 
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Recast in the terminology of A Thousand Plateaus, nonsense, in its ramifications, 
does the same rhizomatic, a-grammatical work as the password. The Deleuzian child 
ramifies. It sketches and skirts the surface, where bodies and things do not confront 
one another as constants, but are articulated as sense.  It embodies the ‘rebel 
becomings’ that insist in language, opening it onto the new (2004, p. 4). 
Lastly, although my commentary has implied that the children are the primary agents 
in the initiation and ramification of refrains, the question of agency is not clear-cut. 
Which came first, the chickenwire or the subject? In a Deleuzian ontology, as noted 
above in the discussion of the example of Jason and his mother, subjects do not pre-
exist the assemblages of which they are components, and do not have a privileged 
perspective on them. Rather, subjects are constituted in and through the assemblages 
in which they move, and which move them. A child may seem to exercise agency and 
decision in ‘quoting’ or ‘mimicking’ a song from a movie, or a line from a TV 
signature tune; but one could equally understand them as ‘occupied’ and animated by 
blocks or fragments of those refrains. Is Joanna taking the chickenwire on a territorial 
foray round the classroom, or is the chickenwire (also) pulling her along as she finds 
out what it might mean, or rather what it might do?
Ramifications
The child ‘knows’ what adults have by and large forgotten. That nonsense is not the 
opposite, but the confederate of sense. That there are more ways to connect than 
through the exchanging of messages or the deciphering of meaning. That words and 
sounds are bodies too, capable of being detached from their syntagmatic and 
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paradigmatic bonds and set in motion to draw a different line. That a-grammaticality 
is a force and not a failure.8 That a capacity for inhuman alliance lives and laughs 
mercilessly alongside and inside human relations. That order and disorder 
(territorialization and deterritorialization; order-word and password) are both at issue 
in the (dis)organisation of the world and of language. 
This is not to suggest that children are seers or savants. Indeed Deleuze and Guattari 
do not consider children’s refrains to be creative. Children’s syntheses lack the 
sobriety and technique needed to wrangle the ‘cosmic forces’ in the heterogeneous 
elements of the assemblage. This requires the sober discipline and the creative savoir-
faire of the poet, artist or composer as ‘cosmic artisan’ (ATP, p. 345) It is only when 
music ‘lays hold of the refrain and deterritorializes it’ (303) that its molecular forces 
are released. The ‘becoming-child’ that insists in the refrain is not therefore, as 
Deleuze and Guattari frequently reiterate, the becoming of the child. 
Nevertheless, it is possible, I think, to take off from the Deleuzian child in order to 
think encounters with children differently, and more creatively. Some caution is 
needed. As Hickey-Moody (2013) notes, the image of the child as a vector of affective 
becoming is a romanticized and therefore a conservative one. As in many other 
philosophical traditions, children are asset-stripped for their conceptual value, at the 
expense of engagement with the material conditions of their lives. Nevertheless, like 
Hickey-Moody, I would argue that the figure of the child in Deleuze has the capacity 
to interrupt ‘adultomorphic’ (Gill-Peterson, 2013) developmental models that validate 
only one path and one end-point, and fail those children who deviate. 
22
One way of attempting such interruptions is to interrogate the prevailing order-words 
that inculcate children into their adult obligations and identities. Earlier in this paper I 
discussed Luke’s (1995) example of Jason being inducted into the ‘majoritarian’ logic 
of representation. As is well known, the collective assemblage of enunciation from 
which Jason’s mother draws her voice is one that envelops mainstream education in 
the countries of the global North. According to Luke and many other critics (e.g. Gee 
2004), though they would not put it in these words, it is this ‘grammaticality’ – this 
shared assumptive architecture of language, self and society – that accounts for the 
marked educational success of the middle classes, whose children start school already 
disposed to survey, parse and explain the world; to extract constants by comparing 
and contrasting fixed entities; to mine story for meaning. Children growing up in 
other situations and assemblages are immersed and disciplined in different practices. 
For instance there are societies such as the Black rural community described by Brice 
Heath (1983), that place a much higher value on the affective, performative, embodied 
aspects of language, and encourage children to develop skills of repartee, ritual insult, 
word-play and ‘fussing’ rather than rational argument or knowing exactly what things 
mean. There are indigenous societies where children are inducted into ways of 
knowing and being that assume that place and land have agency, and recognise 
relationality across human and non-human entities (Jones & Hoskins, 2013; Tuck, 
2014)9. 
The legitimacy of such embodied and affective practices is precisely what is withheld 
in hegemonic assemblages that prioritize the abstracting and generalizing logics of 
representation. However Deleuze and Guattari insist that ‘major’ and ‘minor’ are not 
two different languages, but two different modes or tendencies that subsist within 
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language, one tending towards the extraction of constants; the other towards 
continuous variation. Order-word and password. The importance that some 
communities accord to the a-grammatical and asignifying tendencies that are 
immanent in all language testify to the presence of ‘seeds, crystals of becoming whose 
value is to trigger uncontrollable movements and deterritorializations of the majority’ 
(ATP, p. 106). The problem, and the political project, lies in discovering where the 
trigger is and how to release it.
There are also implications for educational encounters in the classroom. Deleuze and 
Guattari describe the refrain as the a priori or pure form of time, a ‘prism [or] crystal 
of space-time’ (ATP, p. 348) from which ordinary time is fabricated. Similarly, 
sense/nonsense can be understood as the a priori of language: as that which mobilises 
and provides the conditions of emergence of ordinary language, and grants it sense (as 
opposed to purely linguistic meaning). Child refrains such as those that I have 
explored here might be, and often have been, considered ‘junk’ material. They 
represent the kind of activity that registers in classroom observation protocols or 
teacher assessments (if noted at all) as ‘off-task’ and therefore educationally 
worthless. At best they might be recognized and sanctioned as ‘play’ – as a form of 
heterotopic activity that, within conventional early childhood practice, is nevertheless 
seen as a form of preparation of children for entry into the creative aspects of 
humanism. 
But these seemingly trivial and mundane classroom episodes are worthy of attention 
in early years education, if we are to understand more about how the stable 
achievements of language and learning are indebted to, and emerge out of, the 
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movements and rhythms of bodies, in the struggle with formlessness and chaos. The 
refrains of children attest to the interconnections of mind and body, of sounds, matter, 
affects, words and thoughts. Yet one of the main projects of early years education is 
often precisely to disconnect mind and body: to teach children to render their bodies 
immobile so that the mind can be freed to go about its business in Cartesian 
autonomy. This explains why rhythmic, rhizomatic bodily refrains such as fidgeting, 
wandering, doodling, rocking, humming and haptic liaisons with objects are 
problematic from the perspective of adults in the classroom (see MacLure et. al., 
2012).
The wider question is how education can be sensitive to the potential that all children 
have for experiment, improvisation, in order to enhance their capacity to affect and be 
affected. This potential can be glimpsed in the mundane creativity of children’s 
refrains. But it is necessary first to be able to ‘see’ them. The difficulty in ‘seeing’ 
differently is partly a problem of speed and scale. Perhaps children and adults are 
caught up in events that move at different speeds, and are sometimes imperceptible to 
one another. From the perspective of the purposeful, ordered and orderly time of the 
teacher, the refrains of children may look like fooling around or wasteful expenditure. 
Or they may even look like nothing at all, remaining below the threshold of visibility 
set by the categorizing gaze that already ‘knows’ what is and is not significant. 
Mullarkey (2008) suggests that there is an ethical obligation to try to see the events of 
others. ‘Our event, our time, needs the patience of others, just as their time, their 
event, needs our patience and respect’. This is hard to achieve. But early years 
researchers and practitioners, working with new materialist concepts, are beginning to 
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develop experimental practices that are attuned to the a-grammatical sense-making 
capacities of young children (e.g. Olsson, 2012; Seigworth, 2003; Holmes 2012).
Turning finally to the implications for qualitative inquiry: it is clear that conventional 
qualitative method continues to be ‘grammatically’ inclined. Analysis, at least as 
presented in textbooks and courses (St. Pierre, 2013) is dedicated to finding order and 
reducing variation through the application of coding schemes or the extraction of 
themes (MacLure, 2013a). Methods for engaging with qualitative data are still 
preoccupied with depth (as truth, generalization, authenticity or meaning) and intent 
on disciplining the diversions of the surface (jokes, pretense, false fronts, irony, 
irrelevance or double meanings). Analysis still does not really know what to do with 
the matter that lies on the borders of language, body and the virtual - tears, laughter, 
hiccups, fidgeting, silence - to which it makes little sense to respond: what does this  
mean? Or to insist on responding only in this way. It does not handle well those 
moments when affect raises the carefully maintained temper of the relation between 
researcher and ‘subject’, and disgust, fear, surprise or un-nameable sensations infect 
the cool rationality of the encounter. (MacLure, 2013b). Despite many good 
intentions, qualitative research continues to perpetrate an essentially colonial relation 
of mastery over its ‘subjects’, and will do so as long as inquiry is regulated by that 
central point or third eye that flies or floats over the binary distinctions that it 
dispenses. It is only by forgetting the continuous variation from which order emerges 
that we are able to think ourselves as separate from the “data’ that afford us our 
interpretive mastery.
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If qualitative methodology were to acknowledge and mobilize its a-grammatical 
tendencies, its own ‘becoming-child’, this would involve becoming more attentive to 
such ‘troublesome’ moments, as indicators of the potential for creation and escape that 
is the other face of order and pattern. This would not mean giving up a commitment to 
order in favour of an ‘armchair anarchism’ that impotently urges anomie and disorder 
(McClure, 2001, p. 191). Instead, as I have argued elsewhere, we could think of 
qualitative research as ‘an experiment with order and disorder, in which provisional 
and partial taxonomies are formed, but are always subject to change and 
metamorphosis, as new connections spark among words, bodies, objects and ideas 
(MacLure, 2013a, p. 181; emphasis added). 
The experiment with order and disorder is a risky one, and Deleuze and Guattari are at 
pains to point out the risk as well as the promise of the deterritorializating refrain - of 
‘cosmic force gone bad’ (ATP, p. 350; original emphasis). Instead of the creativity of 
new connections, there is always the danger of the collapse of meaning and self into a 
black hole, when the ‘mad element’ that subsists in language is released. But as 
Deleuze argues, the attempt to unleash it is a political and ethical imperative, and I 
will conclude with his challenge, which is of relevance not only to the schooling of 
children, but also to qualitative methodology.
Well then, there’s something like silence, or like stammering, or screaming, 
something slipping through underneath the redundancies and information, 
letting language slip through, and making itself heard, in spite of everything… 
So how can we manage to speak without giving orders, without claiming to 
represent something or someone, how can we get people without the right to 
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speak, to speak; and how can we restore to sounds their part in the struggle 
against power? I suppose that’s what it means to be like a foreigner in one’s 
own language (1995, p. 41).
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Notes
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1 Key collections which give a flavor of the range of approaches contributing to the new 
materialisms include: Dolphijn & Van der Tuin (2012); Alaimo and Hekman (2008); Gregg & 
Seigworth (2010); Barrett & Bolt (2012); Coole & Frost (2010).
2 The Deleuzian critique of representation goes much further back than this, as part of a critique of 
the ‘majoritarian’ traditions of Western philosophy since Plato (e.g. Deleuze, 2004). 
3 Deleuze and Guattari are directly referencing here Chomsky’s famous statement: ‘Linguistic 
theory is concerned primarily with an ideal speaker-listener, in a completely homogeneous speech-
communication, who know its (the speech community's) language perfectly and is unaffected by 
such grammatically irrelevant conditions as memory limitations, distractions, shifts of attention and 
interest, and errors (random or characteristic) in applying his knowledge of this language in actual 
performance. (Chomsky,1965, p. 3).
4 Hickey-Moody, in her important discussion of ‘Deleuze’s children’, which has greatly influenced 
my account here, identifies multiple images of the child in Deleuze, including the ‘psychoanalytic 
girl’, the ‘rhizomatic child’, and the ‘tuber baby’. I do not engage, except in passing, with the 
differences amongst these figures, focusing instead on those points where Deleuze (and Guattari) 
bring the child into productive encounter with questions of language and representation. These 
points traverse, and partially fragment, the distinct child figures identified by Hickey-Moody.  
5 In MacLure (2003) I discuss this example from a broadly discourse-based perspective. The 
present discussion draws on that prior account, though it takes a more materialist slant.
6 See MacLure (2013a) for a discussion of agrammaticality in a poem by Meredith Quartermain, in 
relation to the ‘grammatical’ logic of coding in qualitative research.
7 The classroom recordings were made between 1977 and 1979 as part of a project funded by the 
Nuffield Foundation and the (then) Social Science Research Council, entitled ‘Language in the 
Transition from Home to School’. This project was the final phase of the influential Bristol 
longitudinal language development research program (see Wells, 1981 for a description of the 
project methodology and its findings). 32 children, attending different infant schools, were video- 
and audio-recorded over the course of one morning in their first, second and sixth terms at school. I 
was a researcher on the project.
8 This is not to say that a-grammaticality is necessarily, or always, a positive force. I return to this 
issue later in this concluding section.
9 Tuck (2014) notes that indigenous scholarship is seldom acknowledged in new materialist 
writing. Indigenous work would therefore contest the legitimacy of claims to be ‘new’.
